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Magic,
signs, and making sense
This
lengthy essay has originated as a by-product of a musical composition,
a series of spells and incantations in mostly ancient languages. These
texts were chosen because of their peculiar poetic qualities; qualities
which are not lyrical-reflective or expressive, but derive from the
'performative' character of these texts (to use J.L. Austin’s term):
they
are meant to achieve something. In this, they are a manifestation
of that strange but universal
belief in the ‘magical’ power of spoken, sung or written words.
Much of the puzzlement among linguists
and philosophers manifests the same ‘bewitchment’ (Wittgenstein) which
has produced magical beliefs about the power of
words.
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God
and
the
calculus of belief
Arguments
in contemporary ‘natural theology’, operating with a ‘God-hypothesis’
of an inductive or probabilistic kind, are mistaken for two reasons.
(1) Since the ontological status of the God-concept in theological
tradition excludes it from probabilistic reasoning, the purported
inductive arguments are in fact disguised a priori arguments. (2) These
arguments conflate probability, plausibility, imaginability and
desirability.
Attempts to refute such a ‘God-Hypothesis’ with arguments
within the framework of science are therefore pointless. Instead, the
debate should lay bare the basic intuitions
which motivate the will to believe. If we want to explain the fact that
theistic belief is upheld in spite of illogicality and
implausibility, we should look into the structure of language and
language use.
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